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JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2(a)3(2)(c) as amended 1988, and Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This appeal is taken from Summary Judgment entered against the
Appellant in the Third Circuit Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake County, Salt
Lake Department, and denial of Appellant's Motion to Alter, Amend or
Vacate, made pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

S T A T E M E N T O F ISSUES ON APPEAL

Was the granting of Plaintiffs motion for Summary Judgment
improper and prejudicial error in that there existed and were placed before
the court genuine issues of material fact?
Did the refusal of the Circuit Court to vacate the Summary Judgment
by granting Appellant's Rule 59 Motion supported by uncontradicted
affidavits constitute abuse of discretion and error?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

This case is governed by select provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, U.C.A §70A, et seq., contained in Addendum "A" of
this brief and Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is governed by the special rules of the Uniform
Commercial Code respecting the sale of goods. Respondent filed a
complaint in the Third Circuit Court alleging that a Hermes 51 Typewriter
purchased following a 90 day trial period on July 29, 1987, was defective.
Respondent's complaint stated two counts as grounds for relief. Both
counts sought relief under §70A-2-608. Respondent subsequently filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment, which was heard by the court on October
12, 1988, and granted at that time. Appellant then filed a Motion to Alter,
Amend or Vacate, which was heard on December 14, 1988 and denied at
that time. Appellants Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate tolled the
applicable period of time for appeal of the Summary Judgment granted on
October 12, 1988, pursuant to the holding in Hume v. Small Claims Court.
590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979). Appellant timely filed the present appeal
following the denial of its Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

K & K Insurance (Plaintiff) purchased a Hermes 51 typewriter from
Salt Lake Typewriter (Defendant) which was delivered on or about March
30, 1987. (Complaint para. 7) Plaintiff paid for the typewriter on or about
July 29, 1987, after the trial period of ninety (90) days had lapsed.
Plaintiff has retained the possession and use of the Hermes 51 typewriter
since delivery to date.
At the hearing for Summary Judgment, Defendant's counsel, then
Mr. Hunt, identified the issues of material fact before the court regarding
rejection within a reasonable time and seasonable notification of the
rejection:
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Mr. Hunt: If the Court please, the Commercial
Code uses the term rightfully rejected or
rightfully rescinded. This machine was in use
something over half a year before there even was
a letter.
TSJ at 7.
Plaintiff claimed it experienced problems with the subject
typewriter. (Complaint para. 11, T. 5-6 on Motion for Summary
Judgment, hereinafter "TSJ") After inspection, it was determined that the
complaints and problems were connected to the power supply at Plaintiffs
office then located at 654 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant
had no control over the power source or its stability. A surge protector
was recommended to solve the problem. (See statement of Donald
Thompson, attached as addendum "B") Plaintiff determined that the surge
protector was too expensive and sent it back to Salt Lake Typewriter
without using or paying for it.
Plaintiff, (K & K Insurance) moved its office from its old location to
its present location in October, 1987. Defendant was not made aware that
Plaintiff claimed the problems with the typewriter continued until
receiving a letter dated February 29, 1988, some five (5) months after
Plaintiff moved its offices. Plaintiff claimed that it sent a letter to
Defendant dated February 5, 1988 which was in fact sent by Plaintiff to
itself and signed by their own employee, Mary Strang. Defendant disputes
and denies having ever received this letter.
From approximately February 29, 1988 to March 23, 1988,
Defendant was not given access to the equipment to determine if a problem
existed, and if one did, the nature of the problem. Calls were made by Mr.
Sanders, President of Salt Lake Typewriter, to Mr. Kauffman of K & K
3

Insurance in an attempt to arrange an appointment to have the equipment
inspected, determine if there was a problem and if one existed have it
corrected. Each time Mr. Sanders was told that he would have to talk to
Mr. Kauffman directly, although Mr. Kauffman was not available.

Shortly after the hearing of October 12, 1988 on Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment, Defendant, by its President, Mr. Sanders, made a
surprise visit to the business office of K & K Insurance Company to view
the Hermes 51 typewriter. He was accompanied by L. Keith Day and
Margaret Voyles, both employees of Defendant, Salt Lake Typewriter.
This surprise visit revealed that the Hermes 51 typewriter, the subject of
this action, was in operating condition and in use by Mary B. Strang, the
employee of Plaintiff, K & K Insurance. Mary Strang related to Mr.
Sanders that a representative of Associated Business Machines had found a
loose wire and fixed it. This information was not disclosed by Plaintiff at
the hearing of the Motion for Summary Judgment. (See TSF generally, and
affidavits contained in Addendum "C") Mr. Sanders requested Mary
Strang to produce a repair bill or invoice showing the repair of the
machine, which she could not do. The only explanation was she thought
there had been no charge for the repair of the loose wire. Mary Strang
also stated to Mr. Sanders that the Hermes 51 typewriter had operated
properly from the time Plaintiff moved its office to 4001 South 700 East,
Suite 520, Salt Lake City, Utah and the alleged repair of the loose wire.
(Addendum T " )
Upon discovering this information, Defendant filed its Rule 59
Motion and supported it by Affidavits. Defendant's Rule 59 Motion was
heard by the Court on December 14, 1988. At this hearing, plaintiffs
4

counsel admitted and acknowledged that the Hermes 51 typewriter was still
in possession of plaintiff and in full use. (T. 7, Transcript of Defendant's
Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate, hereinafter "TDM") Defendant's Rule
59 Motion, after it was taken under advisement by the lower Court, Judge
Eleanor Van Sciver, was denied, without a Memorandum or explanation.
The conduct of the court in this matter may prove revealing. On
commencing the hearing regarding Defendant's Motion to Alter, Amend or
Vacate, the court stated in open court, with representatives of Defendant
corporation present:
The Court: Now, I suppose I'll take this case that
keeps popping up more often that any others first.
K&K Insurance Agency vs. Salt Lake Typewriter.
This is your motion Mr. Fankhauser?
Mr. Fankhauser: Yes, it is, your Honor.
The Court: I see Mr. Hunt got tired of this case
and withdrew.
TDM at 2. This raises an issue of whether or not the court properly used
the remedy of Summary Judgment to dispose of cases which present no
issues of genuine material fact and can be disposed of as a matter of law, or
whether or not summary judgment was used to dispose of what the court
improperly felt was a nuisance.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Summary Judgment acts as a harsh remedy which should only be
employed in cases where there clearly is no genuine issue of material fact
which should go to trial by the trier of fact. Because of its harsh result, it
5

should be employed cautiously by the court and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the party moved against, in this case the appellant.
This case involved sections of the Uniform Commercial code which refer
to rejection within a "reasonable time" which are "seasonably" tendered.
These terms raise issues of fact regarding the timing and manner of
rejection of goods. Whether or not a rejection is timely and seasonably
noticed depends entirely upon the circumstances and facts surrounding the
transaction, the nature of the goods and the customs of the trade or
industry. This case does not involve the lapse of a statute of limitations or
the time for filing an answer or some other statutory provision which states
a fixed period of time. We are dealing here with notions of
"reasonableness" and "Seasonableness". These are genuine issues of
material fact which cannot be disposed of properly by summary judgment.
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of factual issues which are more material
and which are in dispute.
Following the entry of summary judgment, Appellant's
representatives paid a surprise visit to the offices of Respondent. The visit
had to be a surprise since Respondent had repeatedly denied Appellant
access to its facilities. New facts were brought to the attention of Appellant
which were known by Respondent at the time judgment had been entered.
These facts were of such a nature that Appellant filed a motion pursuant to
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in order to correct what appeared
to be a serious misrepresentation practiced upon the court by Respondent.
Appellant learned that, not only had there never been a serious problem
with the machine in question, but that it had and was completely functional
and in active use by Respondent. This fact was not discoverable by
Appellant prior to or during trial, since Respondent had denied Appellant
6

access to its facilities repeatedly and Respondent had always maintained,
since the filing of its Complaint that the machine was not functional.
Furthermore, there had never been a "trial" as such, but only a hearing for
Summary Judgment, and Appellant could not therefore discover anything
by due diligence prior to "trial". The serious nature of these allegations,
supported as they were by new uncontested affidavits required the court to
reexamine the order and summary judgment entered earlier. Failure to
due so constituted an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error. The failure
of the court to reexamine these issues by proceeding to trial further
substantiates the apparent prejudice of the court toward the Appellant, as
evidenced by the court's remarks at the commencement of the hearing of
Defendant's Rule 59 Motion.
This court should reverse and remand for new trial on all issues, and
grant Appellant its costs together with any and all other remedies
determined to be fit and proper.

POINT I
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER SINCE THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE PROVISION RAISE GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT REGARDING THE TIMING OF RESPONDENT'S REJECTION
AND NOTIFICATION OF REJECTION.

The standards under which a motion for Summary Judgment should
be granted are clearly set forth in Utah law. There must be no genuine
issue of material fact which requires trial by the trier of fact. If even a
doubt exists as to whether or not there is a material issue of fact, then the
case must go to trial. (See Bowen v. City of Riverton, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah
1982); Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App.
7

1988):Western Pacific Transport v. Beehive State Agricultural Co-op. 597
P.2d 854 (Utah 1979); Foster v. Steed. 432 P.2d 60 (Utah 1967);
Controlled Receivables Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966);
Durham v. Margetts. 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). Furthermore, this
Court, pursuant to the applicable standard of review must liberally
construe all factual allegations in a light most favorable to Appellant, and if
there appears to be a single issue of material fact. (Oberhansly v. Sprouse.
751 P.2d 1155 (Utah App. 1988). The disputed material fact in this case
was raised by the very statute itself under which Respondent claimed relief.
The Uniform Commercial Code, as we shall see, raises issues of fact by
referring to a rightful rejection or revocation of acceptance that is made
within a "reasonable time" based upon "seasonable" notice. By invoking
this section of the Code, Respondent raised an immediate material issue of
fact which could not be properly disposed of by means of Summary
Judgment.
The Complaint alleged a rightful revocation of Respondents
acceptance of the Hermes 51 Typewriter under the provision of U.C.A.
§70A-2-608, et seq. This section states in part that:
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a
reasonable time after the buyer discovers or
should have discovered the ground for it and
before any substantial change in condition of the
goods which is not caused by their own defects. It
is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller
of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights
and duties with regard to the goods involved as if
he had rejected them.
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U.C.A §70A--608 (2) et seq., emphasis added. The rightful rejection of
goods referred to in subsection (3) above is addressed in §70A-2-602, et
seq., which states in part:
(1) Rejection of goods must be within a
reasonable time after their delivery or tender. It
is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies
the seller.
U.C.A §70A--602 (1). The Uniform Commercial code further defines
what is meant by a reasonable rejection and a seasonable notification of
rejection under these provisions:
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking any
action depends on the nature, purpose and
circumstances of such action.
(3) An action is taken "seasonably" when it is
taken at or within the time agreed or if no time is
agreed at or within a reasonable time.
U.C.A. 70A-1-204 et seq. If the revocation of an acceptance of goods is to
be effective, and therefore result in the creation of rights of recovery of
sums paid and damages to Plaintiff/Respondent, such revocation must fit
the terms and rules of rightful rejection under the Uniform Commercial
Code. The rejection, in order to be rightful, must be timely, that is made
within a reasonable time and based upon seasonable notification of the
rejection. The Utah Supreme Court addressed these issues in the case of
Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales. 557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976). The court
stated that:
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What constitutes Ma reasonable time" for return
and request for recission under [§70-2-608] is
usually a question of fact to be determined from
the circumstances of each case.
Christopher at 1012. See also Lanners v. Whitney. 428 P.2d 398 (Or.).
All relief requested by Respondent in its Complaint were premised upon a
timely revocation and rejection of the typewriter under the Uniform
Commercial Code. Whether or not the attempted rejection, which took
place over half a year after the purchase of the machine following a 3
month trial period was or was not reasonable depends on several factual
determinations.
First, the court must consider the customs of the industry; there was
a 90-day warranty on the machine which may serve to set the bounds of
reasonableness in this matter. Second, this was a transaction between
merchants who had a history of dealings with each other. Third, the
alleged notification came several months following the purchase of the
machine. Fourth, when did the problem show up? Fifth, was the problem
attributable to the location of the company, or to the burden placed upon
the power supply at that location? Sixth, exactly when did the alleged
tender of revocation occur? Seventh, what was the exact cause of the
machine's dysfunction? All of these elements address the reasonableness of
the timing of the revocation. The purposes of these provisions are to
guarantee that a buyer cannot purchase a machine and then use it for its
anticipated lifetime and thereafter "reject" it because it developed a
functional problem. The granting of summary judgment under these
conditions effectively undermines the rationale behind the Uniform
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Commercial Code. There were in fact issues of material fact regarding the
timeliness of the revocation and notification of the same.
Respondent objected pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of civil
Procedure, to the form of the affidavit of Odell Sanders, which was filed in
a timely manner. The Utah Supreme Court addressed the sufficiency of
affidavits supporting or opposing motions for Summary Judgment in
Lucky Seven at 752:
One sworn statement under oath is all that is
needed to dispute the averments on the other side
of the controversy and create an issue of fact,
precluding the entry of summary judgment.
The affidavit of Odell Sanders provides disputed facts in excess of that
required under either Rule 56 or Lucky Seven. The cover sheet to the
affidavit states that Mr. Sanders is a fully trained expert in the installation,
repair and maintenance of the Hermes electronic typewriter sold to the
Respondent. He made statements under oath based upon personal
knowledge of the events in question. Aside from the most obvious issue of
material fact in this case (whether or not the amount of time that lapsed
before an alleged notice of revocation of acceptance or rejection under the
UCC), Mr. Sanders raises the following issues specifically. The equipment:
1) was in service for over one year; 2) was used continually without proper
surge protection; 3) was relocated by the customer to another location
where the local power supply to the building was different; 4) was moved
to another location by the customer without proper packing; 5) was
installed by the customer at the new location and not by trained personnel.
Any on?of these factors could be responsible for the alleged malfunctioning
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of the machine, and not some alleged latent defect. The affidavit of Mr.
Sanders was more than sufficient to raise serious issues of material fact.
The court improperly granted summary judgment. The case should be
remanded for proceedings in keeping with the letter and the spirit of the
Uniform Commercial Code.

POINT II
T H E COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO
ALTER, AMEND OR VACATE PURSUANT TO RULE 59 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Rule 59 provides the grounds upon which a motion for new trial
should be granted:
(a) Grounds Subject to the provisions of Rule 61,
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes: . . .
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the
party making the application, which could not,
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at trial.
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Appellant is not
alleging a fraud on the part of Respondent, there was clear evidence of
active and knowing misrepresentations made by Respondent at and before
the hearing on Summary Judgment. The issue now before this court has
been framed in several Utah cases. The granting of a motion for a new
trial based upon newly discovered evidence must be founded upon material
evidence which could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence
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which is of such a nature that the outcome would have been different
below. (Universal Inv. Co. v. Carpets. Inc., 400 P.2d 564 (Utah 1965);
Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980); Dotv v. Town of Cedar
Hills, 656 p.2d 993 (Utah 1982); Kettner v. Snow. 375 P.2d 28 (Utah
962);) Appellant exercised that diligence required by a case of this type in
discovering the issues of fact and law to be resolved at trial. This included
the production of affidavits and other competent evidence. Since the
problem was one of misrepresentation, Appellant argues that due diligence
would likely resulted not in discovery of the complete operational
condition of the machine, but would probably have resulted in further
misrepresentations. The only reason that the functional condition of the
machine was discovered was because of a "surprise" visit to Respondent's
place of business. Appellant there discovered that not only was the
machine functional then, but had been functional all along. Because
Respondent's entire complaint was premised upon the existence of a nonfunctional machine it is difficult to imagine how these facts could not create
a different result than that achieved at the hearing for Summary Judgment.
Therefore, Appellant was entitled to a new trial at which the functionality
of the machine could be addressed.The court below wrongfully denied this
motion in the face of new evidence which was uncontroverted, and which
addressed the propriety and integrity of the most essential facts of the
Complaint.

This case should therefore be remanded with sufficient

instructions to allow Appellant a fair trial of the issues and facts.

CONCLUSION

The Uniform Commercial Code (basis for all relief prayed for by
Respondent) requires revocations to be made in a reasonable time after
13

acceptance of goods in order to be effective. Whether or not Respondent's
alleged rejection was made in a reasonable amount of time is a question of
fact. That question of fact is material because it forms an essential element
of Respondent's claim for relief. The granting of Summary Judgment
under these conditions was improper and resulted in prejudicial error.
Appellant was entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered
facts unknown at trial which would have likely resulted in a different
outcome below. Respondent's misrepresentations go to the heart of the
litigation. Respondent wrongfully recovered a judgment based upon those
misrepresentations. In the interest of the integrity of the judicial system
the interests of justice, this court should reverse and remand for further
proceedings which reflect the intent and the letter of the law.
Respectfully submitted this

r

• ^

day of April, 1989.

Ephraim H. Fankhauser
Attorney for Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed,
postage prepaid, to John B. Anderson, Anderson & Holland, Attorneys for
respondent, at 623 East First South, this ^ ^
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day of April, 1989.

ADDENDUM A
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70A-2-602

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
77 CJS Sales §§ 168,184, 218.
67 AmJur 2d 540 to 545, Sales §§ 386 to 389

Collateral References.
Sales <&=> 164,177.

70A-2-602. Manner and effect of rightful rejection.
(1) Rejection of goods must be within4
delivery or tender.
(2)
/

Subject to the provisions of the two following sections on rejected
goods (sections 70A-2-603 and 70A-2-6Q4),
(a)
*W^*H&fc^
(b)

(3)

after their

^

_.

^T. „

mmrnm

of goods in which he does notnave a security interest under
the provisions of this chapter (subsection (3) of section
70A-2-711), Jw^Hjjdfr^fl^^iiftpr TTTflrtirm fir hnht theci
.jaejile^s* disp<«iticm for & tivcm
I; but
(c)
the buyer lias no further obligations with regard to goods
rightfully rejected.
The seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected are
governed by the provisions of this chapter on seller's remedies in

general

utfpn^mMfii^

History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-602.
Cross-References.
Buyer's right to inspection of goods,
70A-2-513.
Improper delivery, buyer's rights,
70A-2-601.
Merchant buyer's duties as to rightfully
rejected goods, 70A-2-603.
Notice or notification, 70A-1-201.
Payment by buyer before inspection,
70A-2-512.
Reasonable time, 70A-1-204.

Seller's remedies in general, 70A-2-703.
Collateral References.
Sales <3=> 177,178 (2).
77 CJS Sales §§ 220, 224, 342.
67 AmJur 2d 546 to 554, Sales §§ 391 to 397.
Duty of purchaser of goods "on trial" or
"on approval" regarding notice of rejection,
78 ALR 533.
Seller's right to retain down payment on
buyer's unjustified refusal to accept goods, 11
ALR 2d 701.

70A-2-603. Merchant buyer's duties as to rightfully rejected goods.
(1) Subject to any security interest in the buyer (subsection (3) of
section 70A-2-711), when the seller has no agent or place of business at the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under a duty
after rejection of goods in his possession or control to follow any
reasonable instructions received from the seller with respect to the
goods and in the absence of such instructions to make reasonable
efforts to sell them for the seller's account if they are perishable
or threaten to decline in value speedily. Instructions are not
reasonable if on demand indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming.
(2) When the buyer sells goods under subsection (1), he is entitled to
reimbursement from the seller or out of the proceeds for reasonable expenses of caring for and selling them, and if the expenses
86

70A-2-608

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Buyer's acceptance of delayed installment
of goods as waiver of similar default as to
later installments, 32 ALR 2d 1128.
Buyer's acceptance of part of goods as
affecting right to damages for failure to complete delivery, 169 ALR 595.
Form and substance of notice which buyer
of goods must give in order to recover damages for seller's breach of warranty, 53 ALR
2d 270.
Misrouting as affecting duty of the buyer
"Reasonable time."
to accept goods, 46 ALR 1120.
Where purchasers of a motor home, upon
Purchaser's use or attempted use of artifinding a number of defects in the vehicle, cles known to be defective as affecting damsought to rescind the contract the day after ages recoverable for breach of warranty, 33
it was entered, but were persuaded by the ALR 2d 511.
seller to retain the vehicle and take it on a
Right of seller as condition of delivery to
planned trip to California, during which time
the already noted problems persisted and insist on or resort to means not provided by
new ones became manifest so that the day contract to assure payment, 44 ALR 443.
Seller's right to retain down payment on
after they returned home purchasers again
attempted rescission, they acted within a buyer's unjustified refusal to accept goods, 11
"reasonable time" within the meaning of this ALR 2d 701.
section. Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales,
Seller's waiver of sales contract provision
Inc. (1976) 557 P 2d 1009.
limiting time within which buyer may object
to or return goods or article for defects or
Collateral References.
failure to comply with warranty or repreIndemnity <§=> 10, 12; Sales <3=> 179, 285,
sentations, 24 ALR 2d 717.
288 (2), 427.
Sufficiency and timeliness of buyer's notice
42 CJS Indemnity § 15; 77 CJS Sales §§ 218,
under UCC § 2-607 of seller's breach of war225, 339, 346; 78 CJS Sales § 520.
67 AmJur 2d 554 to 559, Sales §§ 399 to 401. ranty, 93 ALR 3d 363.
Use of article by buyer as waiver of right
Acceptance after agreed time of delivery as to rescind for fraud, breach of warranty, or
waiver of damages on account of seller's failure of goods to comply with contract, 41
ALR 2d 1173.
delay, 80 ALR 322.
Deduction of damages from the price,
70A-2-717.
Notice and notification, 70A-1-201.
Performance or acceptance under reservation of rights, 70A-1-207.
Reasonable time, 70A-1-204.
Revocation of acceptance in whole or in
part, 70A-2-608.
Waiver of buyer's objections by failure to
particularize, 70A-2-605.
Warranty against infringement, 70A-2-312.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Counterclaim of buyer.
Breach of promise or agreement on part of
seller to furnish demonstrator does not
defeat the right of seller to recover for goods
sold, but saves to the purchaser the right to
offset by way of counterclaim for any damages which may have been sustained by
reason of the failure of the seller to perform
that part of its agreement. Detroit Vapor
Stove Co. v. Farmers' Cash Union (1923) 61 U
567, 216 P 1075.
Proffer return of goods by buyer.

Where a horse was bought with the knowledge of both parties that he was to be used
for breeding purposes and the horse proved
to be sterile but died before it could be
returned, buyer was not barred from recovery by his failure to proffer the return of the
carcass nor could seller raise his own good
faith as a defense where no fraud was
claimed or shown as it was assumed by the
court that both parties acted in good faith in
respect to the defective horse. Ericksen v.
Poulsen (1964) 15 U 2d 190, 389 P 2d 739.

70A-2-608. Revocation of acceptance in whole or in part.
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit
whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he
has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would
be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
90
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(b)

(2)

(3)

without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance
was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery
before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after
the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and
before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is
not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer
notifies the seller of it.
A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard
to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.
it was entered, but were persuaded by the
seller to retain the vehicle and take it on a
planned trip to California, during which time
the already noted problems persisted and
new ones became manifest so that the day
after they returned home purchasers again
attempted rescission, they acted within a
"reasonable time" within the meaning of this
section. Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales,
Inc. (1976) 557 P 2d 1009.

History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-608.
Cross-References.
Effect of acceptance, 70A-2-607.
Improper delivery, buyer's rights,
70A-2-601.
Proof of market price, 70A-2-723.
Reasonable time, 70A-1-204.
Rightful rejection, manner and effect,
70A-2-602.
Waiver of buyer's objections by failure to
particularize, 70A-2-605.

Collateral References.
Sales <S=> 179, 427.
77 CJS Sales § 225; 78 CJS Sales § 520.
67 AmJur 2d 919 to 926, Sales §§ 710 to 716.

"Reasonable time/'
What constitutes a "reasonable time" for
revocation of acceptance under this section is
usually a question of fact to be determined in
light of the circumstances of the particular
case, and the supreme court upon review will
not disturb a finding on the issue unless
there is no reasonable basis in the evidence
to sustain it. Christopher v. Larson Ford
Sales, Inc. (1976) 557 P 2d 1009.
Where purchasers of a motor home, upon
finding a number of defects in the vehicle,
sought to rescind the contract the day after

Measure and elements of buyer's recovery
upon revocation of acceptance of goods under
UCC § 2-608 (1), 65 ALR 3d 388.
Time for revocation of acceptance of goods
under UCC § 2-608 (2), 65 ALR 3d 354.
What constitutes "substantial impairment" entitling buyer to revoke his acceptance of goods under UCC § 2-608, 98 ALR 3d
1183.

70A-2-609. Right to adequate assurance of performance.
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the
other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be
impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with
respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing
demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he
receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend
any performance for which he has not already received the agreed
return.
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity
and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined
according to commercial standards.
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not prejudice
the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of future
performance.
91
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

"Good faith" defined, 70A-1-201 (19),
70A-2-103(l)(b).

Collateral References.
17 CJS Contracts §494.

by ETO£?M8. 0 r
^
Merchant buyer's duties as to rejected
goods, 70A-2-603.
Option to accelerate at will, 70A-1-208.
Substituted performance of contract for
sale, 70A-2-614.

1 5 A A m J u r 2d 478

' Commercial Code § 26.

Effectiveness of original financing statement under UCC article 9 after change in
debtor's name, identity, or business structure, 99 ALR 3d 1194.

70A-1-204. Time — Reasonable time — "Seasonably,"
(1) Whenever this act requires any action to be taken within a reasonable time, any time which is not manifestly unreasonable may be
fixed by agreement.
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the
nature, purpose and circumstances of such action.
(3) An action is taken "seasonably" when it is taken at or within the
time agreed or if no time is agreed at or within a reasonable time.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 1-204.
^
Questions of fact and law.
What constitutes a reasonable time is usually a question of fact, but if the time elapsed
was outside the ambit which fair-minded
persons might conclude was reasonable, it

should be ruled upon as a matter of law. Lish
v. Compton (1976) 547 P 2d 223.
Collateral References.
Time <3= 15.
86 CJS Time § 8.
15A AmJur 2d 480, Commercial Code § 27.

70A-1-205. Course of dealing and usage of trade.
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the
parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded
as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting
their expressions and other conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify
an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to
be proved as facts. If it is established that such a usage is embodied
in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the
writing is for the court.
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the
vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are
or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or
qualify terms of an agreement.
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of
dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable
as consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control both course of dealing and usage of
trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.
(5) An applicable usage of trade in the place where any part of performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as
to that part of the performance.
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STATE OF T3TAH

)

XUNTY OF SALT LAKE

) —-

, Donald Thompson_being duly sworn deposes s^id states ^hat he made the foregoing
statement and that the same is true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

Notarjr Public: ^ % ^ * f f L - — v ^ ^ L —
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E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No, 1032
Attorney for Defendant
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

*

K & K INSURANCE AGENCY,
*
*

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT OR VACATE JUDGMENT

*

Civil No.

*

Judge Eleanor Van Sciver

Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER, INC.
a Utah Corporation,

883003265 CV

*

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss •
)

ODELL SANDERS, being first sworn on oath deposes and states
that he is the President

of Defendant, Salt Lake

Typewriter,

Inc., and has personal knowledge of the matters stated herein.
1.

Affiant, together with L. Keith Day and Margaret Voyles

went to the business office of K & K Insurance Agency on or about
October

, 1988, for the purpose of viewing the

which is the subject of this action.

typewriter

2.

Upon

entering

the business office of K & K Insurance

Agency, Affiant observed the Hermes 51 typewriter, which

is the

subject of this action, to be on a desk, in operating condition
and

in use.

Mary B. Strand was the person who was

using

the

typewriter.
3.

Upon observing the typewriter in use, I inquired of Mary

B. Strand concerning
related

the machine and her use of

it.

She

then

to me that the typewriter had been in use continuously

since K & K Insurance Agency moved its office from 654 South 9th
East, Salt

Lake City, Utah to 4991 South 700 East, Suite 520,

Salt Lake City, Utah,
machine

would

not

I inquired

operate

properly

about
and

the claims
was

that

defective.

the
She

related to me that Associated Business Machines had found a loose
wire and had fixed it.

I requested she produce the repair bill

or invoice showing repair of the machine.

She could not produce

a repair order or invoice and then stated that she thought that
there had been no charge for the repair of the loose wire.
4.

She stated

in my presence and the presence of L. Keith

Day and Margaret Voyles that the machine had operated

properly

since K & K Insurance Agency had moved its offices to 4001 South
700 East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City, Utah and the alleged repair
of the loose wire by Associated Business Machines.

5.

All of this information was well known to the Plaintiff

at the time of the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment.
That the Plaintiff willfully failed to disclose this information
to

the Court.

typewriter

had

Plaintiff
sat

idle

represented
for months

to

and

the Court

that

the

was out of service.

Plaintiff also claimed to hold a security interest in the subject
typewriter

until recovery of the purchase price sought

action

its Motion

by

for

Summary

Judgment.

in this

Under

these

circumstances, the typewriter was not accessible to Affiant for
the purpose of determining that the typewriter was not
i d l e , was

in use

and

had

been

in use

in fact

continuously

by

the

Plaintiff from the time of filing the Motion for Summary Judgment
to and including the date of hearing before this Court.
6.

I reaffirm my former Affidavit on file in this case to

the effect

that

the problem with the machine was the improper

power source used by Plaintiff at its prior business office, 654
South
source

9th East, Salt Lake City, Utah as
now

being

used

by

Plaintiff

at

opposed to the power
its

present

office

location, 4001 South 700 East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City, Utah
and not due to any defect in the machine itself.

/L
&UA\
/<
ODfiLL SANDERS
A

sV(?<syi*<XAfA
s\/Girls!«t^&As<-

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ffli*

da

Y

of

November, 1988.

J.

A***f{^

NOT
)TJ\RY PUBLIC *
R e s i d i n g i n S a l t Lake C o u n t y ,
My Commission E x p i r e s :

Utah

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I
mailed
First

certify
to

John

South,

November,

a
B.

Salt

1988.

true

and

correct

Anderson,
Lake C i t y ,

copy

Attorney
Utah

84102

of

for
on

the

foregoing

Plaintiff,
this

-^L

623
day

was
East
of

E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Defendant
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
534-114 8

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

K & K INSURANCE

AGENCY,
*

AFFIDAVIT OF L. KEITH DAY

*

Civil No.

*

Judge Eleanor Van Sciver

Plaintiff,
883003265 CV

vs.
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendant.

*

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss .
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

L. KEITH
that

he

has

DAY,

*

being

personal

first

sworn

knowledge

on oath deposes and

of

the

r

1988,

matters

set

states
forth

hereinbelow.
1.
Sanders

On
and

or

about

Margaret

October ^c^7
Voyles

to

the

I accompanied

business

office

of

Odell
K

& K

Insurance Agency, 4001 South 700 East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City,
Utah.

2.
Agency

On arrival
I observed

at the business office of K & K Insurance

the Hermes 51 typewriter

to be on a desk, in

use and operated by Mary B. Strand.
3.
Odell

I was present and heard all of the conversation between

Sanders

continued

and

Ms* Strand

pertaining

use of the typewriter.

to the operation and

Ms. Strand

admitted

that

the

typewriter had been used continuously by K & K Insurance Agency
contrary
several

to

their

months.

representations

that

it

had

set

idle

I heard her tell Mr. Sanders that Associated

Business Machines had found a loose wire and repaired it.
present when she indicated

I was

she could not produce a repair order

or invoice from Associated Business Machines.
Sanders

for

She stated to Mr.

that the machine had been in use and operated

properly

since K & K Insurance Agency moved its office to 4001 South 700
East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City, Utah^and was operating properly
on this occasion.

r. KEITH DAY
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

Z^fS

day of

November, 1988.

h *>„ .

My
CDr>rri3S!on
„
—

,

I0TARY PUBLIC '
NOT
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

-2-

E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Defendant
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

K & K INSURANCE AGENCY,
*

AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET VOYLES

*

Civil No.

*

Judge Eleanor Van Sciver

Plaintiff,
883003265 CV

vs.
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,

*

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
MARGARET

*

)
: ss.
)

VOYLES, being

first

sworn

on oath

deposes

and

states that she has personal knowledge of the matters set forth
hereinbelow.
1.
Sanders

On or about October
and

L. Keith

Day

<£$*}: ,

1988, I accompanied

to the business

office

of

Odell
K & K

Insurance Agency, 4001 South 700 East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City,
Utah.

2.

On arrival at the business office of K & K Insurance

Agency I observed the Hermes 51 typewriter to be on a desk, in
use and operated by Mary B. Strand.
3.

I was present and heard all of the conversation between

Odell Sanders and Ms. Strand pertaining to the operation and
continued use of the typewriter.

Ms. Strand admitted that the

typewriter had been used continuously by K & K Insurance Agency
contrary

to their

several months.

representations

that

it had

set idle for

I heard her tell Mr. Sanders that Associated

Business Machines had found a loose wire and repaired it.

I was

present when she indicated she could not produce a repair order
or invoice from Associated Business Machines.

She stated to Mr.

Sanders that the machine had been in use and operated properly
since K & K Insurance Agency moved its office to 4001 South 700
East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City, Utah and was operating properly
on this occasion.

MARGARET ^ V O Y L E S ^

S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s
November,

U

3*^

d

a y of

1988.
J

Mf^NL V

l^loUKxrl

NOTARY PUBLIC
R e s i d i n g in S a l t Lake County,
My Commission E x p i r e s :
-2-

Utah

E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar N. 1032
Attorney for Defendant
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

K & K INSURANCE AGENCY,

AFFIDAVIT OF ODELL SANDERS
IN OPPOSITION TO AFFIDAVIT
OF ROBERT D. KAUFMAN

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER, INC.,
A Utah Corporation,

Judge Van Sciver

883003265 CV

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

: ss.
)

ODELL SANDERS, being

sworn on oath deposes and states that

he is the President of Defendant, Salt Lake Typewriter, Inc., a
Utah Corporation, and
stated herein.
Kaufman, dated

has personal

In opposition
December

knowledge

of the matters

to the Affidavit

2, 1988, the following

of Robert

D.

statements are

submitted to the Court for its information and consideration.

1.

The

Hermes

51

Typewriter

Plaintiff, K & K Insurance Agency
period
1987.

had

lapsed.

was

after

purchased

by

the acceptable

The typewriter was delivered

the
trial

on March 30,

The actual sale was not completed until July 29, 1987.
2.

The old Hermes 51 typewriter referred to by Mr. Kaufman

in his Affidavit was more of a typewriter and did not have the
same circuitry or devices that the new 51 Hermes possessed.

The

new Hermes

and

51 typewriter

had

completely

different

circuitry, with added screen and disc drive.
lose its memory when the power went off.
had

no control

over

the power

CPU

The machine would

Salt Lake Typewriter

source or the stability of the

power source that existed at K & K f s offices located at 654 South
900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

Contrary

Typewriter

never

to the statements of Mr. Kaufman, Salt Lake
retook

the machine

after

it was

delivered.

Further, K & K Insurance Agency did not keep the surge protector,
and did not purchase it as claimed.

K & K Insurance determined

that the surge protector was too expensive and sent it back to
Salt Lake Typewriter without using or paying for it.
4.

There

typewriter
location

never

other

was

than

of K & K.

a problem

the power

Contrary

with

problem

the
at

new

the

to the statements

Hermes
old

51

office

of Robert D.

Kaufman, in paragraph 3 of his Affidavit, no promises were made

that the machine would be replaced or corrected.

In fact, the

machine was paid for 90 days after it was delivered and used by K
& K Insurance.

At the time payment was made, K & K Insurance was

satisfied with the equipment and that it was working properly.
5.

Contrary

to the statements

of Mr. Kaufman, the only

service call that was placed to Salt Lake Typewriter was related
to the inadequate power source in the building occupied by K & K
Insurance

at 654 South

900 East, Salt

Lake City, Utah.

The

statement by Mr. Kaufman that the surge protector did not cure
the problem was due to the fact that it was not used by K & K.
6.

The statement by Mr. Kaufman that the old Hermes machine

continued
same

to operate without surge problem or protector

circuit

was

due

completely different.
typewriter

and

did

to

the

fact

the

machines

were

As stated, the old machine was more of a
not have the same circuitry,

monitor, disc drive and added memory
Hermes 51.

that

on the

of

the new

capability,
computerized

Further, the old machine was on the opposite side of

the room and connected to an entirely different outlet.
7.

The Court

should

be aware that the letter claimed to

have been sent on February 5, 1988, was in fact sent by K & K
Insurance
Strang.

to themselves and signed by their own employee, Mary
Until

the

letter

of February

29, 1988, Salt

Lake

Typewriter and myself were not aware until this point that there

was a problem.

Mr. Kaufman states that K & K moved its office in

October, 1987.
waited

five

This gives rise to the question

(5) months

of why

to notify Salt Lake Typewriter

K & K

that it

claimed a problem existed.
8.

From

the

time

the

letter

of February

29, 1988 was

received to the time the letter of March 23, 1988 attempting to
revoke was sent and received, Salt Lake Typewriter was not given
access to the equipment to determine if a problem existed, and if
one did, what the nature of the problem was.
9.

Contrary

paragraph

5 of his

Typewriter

to

the

statements

Affidavit,

to K & K Insurance

made

by Mr. Kaufman

calls were
in an

made

attempt

by Salt

to

in

Lake

arrange

an

appointment to have the equipment inspected to determine if there
was a problem, but was refused.
10.

The statements made by Mr. Kaufman

paragraphs 6 and 7 are totally disputed.
surprise visit
from

this

Business

claims.

Equipment

found

a

a repairman

loose wire.

that they produce a copy of the repair order.

date, no service

statement

It was not until our

in October, 1988 that K & K claimed

Associated

requested

in his Affidavit,

has

been

order

produced

or a copy of a repair

Further, Associated Business Equipment

copier company.

As of

order

by K & K to substantiate

We

or

their

is basically a

In that the Hermes 51 is a state of the art with

modular plug in components, the only wires that could be found
exposed would be to a light in the cover.
inspection of the equipment

Based on my personal

in October, 1988, it is my opinion

that the equipment worked properly and there never has been any
repair to the machine as alleged.

Further, the fact remains that

there has never been any evidence produced that the equipment had
an unknown defect
power interruption.
five

other

than the problems associated with the

The first notice of any alleged problem came

(5) months after K & K moved its offices on or about March

1, 1988.

I also wish to note that Mr. Kaufman does not deny that

the new Hermes 51 typewriter, at the time of my surprise visit in
October, 1988, was in fact in use and operating at the office of
K & K Insurance by its employee, Mary B. Strand.

r^A/j
4
ODELL SANDERS
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
December, 19&*•" ^* J'/,^

/
ff-i

/2

day °f

r\
ZL^~ -£- -i_ <-^u^

'."-V— »s NOTARY/PJJBLIC
>r
• -.•-•!== 1. Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires: <v/////.^.x^

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand
delivered to

John B. Anderson, Attorney for Plaintiff, 623 East

First South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 on this

/2.&~

December, 1988.

{ax^a-^t

day of

'..ayle Dean Hunt
Attorney for Defendant
2121 South State,
Salt Lake C i — "• - 1
tel 4868701
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" r e s i d e n t of Defendant company anc
installation,

repairs

..eposes and s a y s he

u;.!v t r a i n e d expert

t h e Hermes e l e c t r o n I

i r o r m e o t ^ n t h e r ewi t h
Mf summci,rv> a t t a c h e d
d e f e n c t s and *\a*

nereto respecting condition,
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and
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a r e t r u e ctiid c o r r e c t .

Odell L. Sanders
Subscribed and sworn to before m e June 24^T9iJ8.

M^

iry Public-risidien in Salt Lake
County, >;tah
My commission expires Jan. 1
A N HUNT
' AT LAW
m tTATe
CITY,

«

SALT LAKEl I TYPEWRITER

April 13, 1988
RE:

Civil #883003265CV

Clerk
Fifth Judicial Circuit Court
Salt Lake County
Salt Lake Department
State of Utah
To Whom It May Concern:
The equipment purchased by K & K Insurance Agency was, in
fact accepted on March 30, 1987 (see Exibit A)
trial period and not July 29th as indicated.

After a prior

The equipment

worked perfectly at the time of installation and also 4 months
later when they paid for the equipment.
The only service calls that were performed on this equipment
were due to power failure at K & K Insurance, there was other
equipment on the same circuit and overloading the breaker.

Salt

Lake Typewriter made several requests to have the equipment put
on a isolated line or use a battery back up surge protector to
prevent electrical damage to the equipment we also went as far as
to install at our expense a battery back up line filter.

This

device would sound a alarm to allow the operator to reset the
breaker after a power outage or power surge. The operator
unplugged this device because the alarm annoyed her and plugged
the equipment in direct, "proving the power problem at K & K
Insurance did exist."
The only other problem was cables unplugged at the
equipment.

*"-

'•"TV

M

TAH

84111

/

PHONE

(801)

364-8600

.AKEl I TYPEWRITER

We have made every attempt to iectit> -in> problems inat nave
come I i light, 1.11«-- problems that have existed at K H
Insurance"
have

i

een beyond nut control, because thev would not '©operate.

Exibit (C) was never received, and signed ( nr I

in unknown

person,

Due to the tact

Exibit 101 was received March 1, I ill..

this equipment has1 l:u;jj , m

service for over one year iUid IJ.-I I

continually without proper power protection and has also bec-n
relocated by Lhe customer Lu another location, Jithoul proper
packing and installation - i.all Lake Typewriter cannot be
responsible for tne condition of this equipment
service this equipment *** required to brin,1 if
operating condition

We can and will
i > pr"| >

I i \M iui*y wawvuHe is '<M *'^M

<""iich has

ton^ since expired.
We will be williiii, in ivui. i wi LU K \ H. Insurance to resolve
this matter. However, diif* I i the l»*n • th of time involved, and I lie
conditions in whi^h the equipment was subjected, the r nt of
repair will h

|

K & Y Insurance,

i_
ff.W'J-

j/osy'-'b^

Odell L Sand«>
President
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER
777 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah
cc:

~~" —
. .- tor . . .
f
st First f utn
.o,i Lak? fit
:ah 84102

Jv,.

•i :, T A i r

84111

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On June 24, 1988 I mailed/delivered a copy of the foregoing Response
to Motion for Summary Judgment to the following:

John B. Anderson
William A. Sornppi
Anderson & Holland
Attorneys for Plaintiff
623 East First South
SLC, Utah 84102
Telephone: 363-9345

Attachments:
1. Affidavit of Odell L. Sanders
2.

IAYI.E DEAN HUNT
ATTORMSY AT LAW
11 SI SOUTH STATE
• ALT

LAKK

CITY.

Affidavit of

